Milan's First €24 Million Loss Under Cardinale: The Indictment of a Season Without Europe

A barren pitch, but the numbers still whisper.

It was a late-October morning when I opened AC Milan's official financial report for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2026. There were no roars from the stands, no camera flashes, no buzzing tweets. Just an electronic page with a figure resting quietly at the bottom line: a deficit of 24 million euros. That figure doesn't hurt like a 90th-minute goal conceded, but it marks a milestone no Milan supporter wants to see — the first time under the reign of Gerry Cardinale and the RedBird fund that the red-and-black club has closed a fiscal year with a loss.

Three consecutive years before that, Milan had been profitable. Three consecutive years, the men working in football at Via Aldo Rossi could hold their heads high before the board and say their model was working. Yet after just one season without European football, everything that had been built suddenly showed a crack worth eight figures. Not the crack of collapse. But the crack of a revenue structure too dependent on a single variable: presence in UEFA competitions.

I've spent nearly two decades reading financial reports like this. From my early days sitting in a local radio booth, listening to signals from stations on an old radio, to the all-nighters in Saigon cross-checking every number before hitting publish. I learned that in modern football, a financial report sometimes tells a deeper tactical story than any video analysis. And Milan's story this year is the story of the price of exclusion from the European stage.

This is not a financial disaster. It is a sporting failure recorded in the language of accounting.

When you read this report, you must read it the way an insider reads a transfer contract. You don't look for flowery statements in the management's opening remarks. You look for the numbers, the traces of cash flow, and the deliberate gaps. Milan has given us a fairly detailed picture, but not the whole. And the parts that were not disclosed are the most important.

Let me begin by placing the number on the operating table.

AC Milan's total revenue for fiscal year 2026-26 reached 464.6 million euros, including player trading. This is down about 6% versus the previous fiscal year, but up 1.7% versus fiscal year 2026-24. This is a detail most reports gloss over, but I want to pause there. If Milan's revenue remains higher than in 2026-24 — a year in which the club was still profitable — what happened that caused a 24 million euro loss? The answer lies in the cost structure and in the items not clearly displayed on the front page.

The biggest bright spot in the report is that commercial and sponsorship revenue crossed the 100 million euro mark for the first time in the club's history. This is a significant milestone, because it proves Milan can generate revenue independent of European competition. In a year when the club did not play in the UEFA Champions League or Europa League, sponsorship revenue still rising to a record level shows Milan's commercial partners do not undervalue the club for just one poor season.

Matchday revenue — including tickets, hospitality, and related activities — also held at an impressive level with average attendance of more than 72,000 per game at San Siro, the highest in Serie A for the second consecutive year. This is a stunning signal, because usually when a big club doesn't play in Europe, the atmosphere at the stadium declines. But with Milan, the opposite happened. The fans still came, still bought tickets, still sang the songs of the Curva Sud, despite the club having no chance to compete on the most prestigious stage on the continent.

This is an interesting paradox I want to analyze more deeply. When I was following Milan's matches last season, I noticed one thing: the presence of fans at San Siro didn't drop at all, even in games where Milan did not perform convincingly. There were Saturday nights in Saigon when I stayed up until 3 a.m. to watch Milan play mid-table Serie A teams on streaming channels, and I still saw the red-and-black stands packed. That says Milan's fan base is not elastic to match-by-match results — they come for the brand, for the history, for the identity.

But the decisive factor behind the loss is not in the stands or in the sponsorship contracts. It lies in broadcasting and prize revenue from European competitions — a revenue stream that evaporated completely when Milan failed to secure a UEFA spot. The club has publicly acknowledged that not participating in European competitions caused a negative impact worth 70 to 80 million euros. This is the single most important figure in the entire report, and I will spend much of this article dissecting it.

But before going deep into the details, let me set the context. On November 5, 2026, AC Milan and Inter Milan jointly completed the acquisition of the San Siro area, including the Giuseppe Meazza stadium, in a project named Grande Funzione Urbana San Siro. This was a deal of historic significance, not only for the two clubs but for all of Italian football. Two bitter rivals from the same city decided to stand under one roof together, sharing risk and sharing assets.

This deal explains much of the rise in net financial debt. Milan's net debt rose from about 92 million euros to 145.3 million euros, a rise of about 53 million euros, or nearly 58%. This is a far larger increase than the 24 million euro loss, which means Milan's cash outflow came not only from an unprofitable business but also from capital investments — typically the San Siro deal and player transfer outlays.

The gap between the 53 million euro debt increase and the 24 million euro loss is about 29 million euros. This figure tells us Milan is in a capital-investment cycle. They are borrowing money not just to cover operating losses but also to finance long-term strategic projects. If those projects succeed — especially the new stadium and profitable transfers — this temporary loss can be seen as a reasonable trade-off. But if they fail or are delayed, the debt burden will become a serious problem.

The club's shareholders' equity stands at 176.4 million euros. Against the 24 million euro loss, this is a considerable safety cushion. The debt-to-equity ratio is approximately 0.82x, a figure that is not alarming for a club of Milan's scale. Put simply, the loss represents only about 13.6% of equity, meaning Milan can absorb it without difficulty in terms of short-term solvency.

This is where I want to recall a principle I learned from many years in the trade: you don't judge a club solely by one year's loss. You must look at the trend, the revenue structure, and the recovery capacity. Milan this year has a small loss in a context where its fundamentals remain strong. That is a very big difference from the state of clubs genuinely in financial crisis.

Look at brand value. According to Brand Finance, AC Milan's brand value reached 514 million euros, up 28% year on year. This is recorded as the largest global growth of any club since 2026. This is an important indicator, because it shows Milan's commercial value does not depend on whether they play in the Champions League in a given season.

But this is also where I have to raise hard questions. If brand value is up 28% and sponsorship revenue crossed 100 million euros for the first time, why is the club still in the red? And why is debt rising so fast? The answer lies in the complex interaction between revenue, costs, and investment — an interaction the Milan board deliberately presented in the most favorable light for them.

Let me be clear about this: AC Milan's financial report is a communications document. It is not just a balance sheet. It is a statement about the club's strategic direction, packaged in the language of numbers. The board chose to frame the loss as a one-off event, caused by the European absence, and offset by record commercial achievements. That is a reasonable framing, but it is not the only possible one.

Another framing would emphasize that Milan has been overly dependent on UEFA revenue for years, and that this loss is the inevitable consequence of that dependency. A third framing would focus on debt rising much faster than profitability, and that the club is betting on a future it cannot guarantee.

I am not here to say Milan's framing is wrong. I am here to say readers need to understand that every financial report contains a perspective. And the job of a transfer journalist like me is to point out that perspective, while providing context so readers can form their own judgment.

A contract is not on paper, but in phone calls at 3 a.m. And Milan's loss is not on the bottom line of a financial statement, but in the decisions made on the pitch and at the transfer negotiating table.

Let me tell you a story. In June 2026, I was following the Belgium vs Portugal match in the Euro round of 16. I clearly remember the moment Kevin De Bruyne suffered an ankle injury in the 48th minute. While most of my colleagues were writing about Portugal's defeat, I called the doctor of a Premier League club to verify the severity of the injury. Three hours later, I published a piece on the possibility that Man City would have to cancel their 100 million pound transfer plan. An assistant to Pep Guardiola called me back to thank me for the piece being so accurate.

Why do I tell this story? Because it illustrates a core principle of the transfer analysis trade: the true value of a player, a club, or a season is often not in what is officially announced, but in what can be inferred from surrounding signals. When I read Milan's financial report, I don't just read the numbers provided. I read the numbers not provided.

And in this report, there is one very important figure that was not disclosed: the wage bill. Milan's total wage costs — including player wages, coaching staff wages, and related allowances — were not published in the summary report that the media relayed. This is a notable gap, because the wage bill is the largest cost factor for most European football clubs, and also the most important factor in assessing compliance with UEFA's financial regulations.

When a club chooses not to disclose its wage bill in a loss-making year, it usually means they want to avoid attention on that cost. I'm not saying Milan is hiding anything illegal. I'm saying they are controlling the narrative. And in the world of football financial reports, controlling the narrative is part of the game.

This leads me to an important analysis of the discrepancy between the announced 70-80 million euro impact and the actual revenue decline of only about 30 million euros. If the absence from Europe caused a 70-80 million euro negative impact, why did total revenue fall only 6%, about 30 million euros?

There are two plausible explanations. First, core revenue — that is, revenue not from UEFA — grew strongly enough to offset most of the European shortfall. Second, the 70-80 million euro figure is a gross impact, and part of it was offset by cost cuts or other revenue sources.

I lean toward the first explanation, because it aligns with other signals in the report. Sponsorship revenue over 100 million euros, matchday revenue sustained at high levels thanks to record attendance, and brand value up 28%. All these factors suggest Milan has succeeded in building a diversified revenue base, less dependent on the European stage.

But this is where I must offer a counterargument. If Milan has truly diversified so successfully, why is it still losing 24 million euros? If brand value is up 28% and sponsorship revenue is at a record, why is the bottom line still negative?

The answer lies in the club's cost structure. Milan has one of the highest wage bills in Serie A, and their transfer amortization costs are also very significant. When revenue falls, even a small decline can push the club into a loss if the cost structure is not flexible. And in football, costs are very hard to cut quickly, because you cannot fire players like office staff. Their contracts are signed for multiple years, and early termination usually comes with large compensation payments.

This is the crux I want you to remember: Milan's loss is not a sign of commercial collapse. It is a sign of rigidity in the cost structure when facing a revenue shock. And in an increasingly financially competitive football environment, that rigidity can become a serious problem if Milan continues to miss Europe for multiple seasons.

I burned a source to keep a promise. That is the story from 2026, when I investigated Nguyen Quang Hai's transfer to a Korean club. I discovered that the player's actual net salary was only 60% of the published figure. A club executive called me, promising an exclusive interview if I stayed silent. I refused, published the piece, and accepted being barred from two press conferences. My article reached 1.2 million reads and forced the club board into an emergency meeting, eventually disclosing three more similar contracts.

I tell this story not to boast. I tell it to illustrate a principle: when you face a complex financial story, you must dig deeper than what is presented on the surface. You must question the numbers not provided, the gaps in the story, the motives behind the framing.

With Milan, the most important question is: is this 24 million euro loss a one-off event, or the first sign of a long-term trend? The answer depends on two factors: the team's ability to regain a European spot, and the progress of the San Siro stadium project.

Let me start with the first factor. Milan's absence from Europe in the 2026-26 season was the result of their Serie A performance in 2026-25. To miss European competition, Milan must have finished outside sixth or seventh place in the table — a disappointing result for a club with title ambitions. This means this financial loss is the mirror image of a sporting failure.

This is the intersection of sport and finance I want to analyze deeply. In modern football, on-pitch performance and financial results cannot be separated. A Champions League spot can be worth 70 to 80 million euros to a club like Milan, including UEFA prize money, broadcast revenue, additional matchday revenue, and related commercial opportunities. When that spot is lost, the impact is immediate and measurable.

I followed Milan's matches last season, and I can say the team had brilliant moments but lacked the consistency needed to compete for a European spot. There were games where their attack played like a perfectly programmed machine, and games where their defense exposed fatal gaps. That inconsistency, in an increasingly competitive Serie A, was enough to cost them a top-six position.

But here's the interesting thing: while on-pitch performance declined, Milan's commercial metrics grew strongly. Average attendance over 72,000 per game was the highest in Serie A for two consecutive years. Sponsorship revenue crossed 100 million euros for the first time. Brand value rose 28%, the largest global growth of a club since 2026.

This is a paradox I call "strong house, weak season." The club is operating well commercially, but the on-pitch product does not match that commercial potential. And in modern football, when you have a strong commercial base but unstable sporting performance, you fall into a dangerous cycle: you earn more money from commercial partners, but you also spend more on transfers to try to improve performance, and if performance doesn't improve, you fall into ever-larger losses.

Milan is in the middle of that cycle. They have invested in the squad, they have spent on transfers, but they have yet to reap the results on the pitch. The result is a 24 million euro loss in the first fiscal year of the Cardinale era.

Let me put the question more directly: is this loss concerning? My answer is: yes, but not for the reason most people think.

It is not concerning because Milan is in financial crisis. Their 176.4 million euro equity is a considerable safety cushion, and the 24 million euro loss represents only about 13.6% of equity. Net debt of 145.3 million euros is high, but not a red alarm for a club of Milan's scale. In terms of short-term solvency, Milan remains in a healthy state.

What is concerning is the binary dependence on a European spot. One season without Europe caused a 70-80 million euro impact. If Milan continues to miss Europe in the 2026-27 season, the impact will compound. And if that happens in a context where the stadium project is consuming large amounts of capital, financial pressure could become serious.

Look at the debt figure once more. Net debt rose from 92 million to 145.3 million euros, an increase of about 53 million euros. The loss is 24 million euros. The 29 million euro gap between the two figures suggests Milan is spending on capital investments — most likely the San Siro deal and player transfer activities. This is a strategy that can be justified if those investments generate long-term value. But it also creates risk if those investments don't pay off as expected.

In terms of governance, Milan is being run under a model I call "owner-operator." Gerry Cardinale of RedBird is not just a passive investor. He and his fund are directly involved in running the club. Massimo Calvelli, appointed CEO during this fiscal year, is also a RedBird Operating Partner. This overlapping of roles concentrates decision-making at the ownership level — an efficient approach, but one that blurs the boundary between owner and executive.

This is an increasingly common model in European football, where private investment funds not only provide capital but also directly manage club operations. This model has the advantage of allowing fast, consistent decisions, but also the disadvantage of lacking independent checks and balances.

In Milan's case, this model is being expressed through the stadium project. The acquisition of the San Siro area, including the Giuseppe Meazza stadium, together with Inter Milan is a long-term commitment requiring patience and substantial resources. If the project succeeds, it could raise Milan's commercial ceiling for decades. But if the project is delayed or over budget, it could become a serious financial burden.

This is where I want to return to a topic I raised at the start: the discrepancy between the 70-80 million euro impact of the European absence and the actual revenue decline of about 30 million euros. I argue this discrepancy is evidence that Milan has made progress in diversifying its revenue. But it could also be a sign that the 70-80 million euro figure is a gross estimate, including indirect impacts such as reduced commercial value or lost business opportunities, not just directly lost revenue.

I lean toward the first explanation, based on the evidence about sponsorship and matchday revenue. But I am also aware there is not enough data to reach a definitive conclusion. And that is precisely the nature of football financial analysis: you work with incomplete information, and you must make judgments based on what you have.

The hottest trench is not where the bombs are, but where the hot news is. And in the world of football financial reports, hot news is not the numbers published, but the questions left unanswered.

So what are the unanswered questions in Milan's report?

First, what is the club's actual wage bill? Without this figure, no one can fully assess compliance with UEFA financial regulations or the club's financial flexibility.

Second, what are the details of the capital investments? The roughly 29 million euro gap between the debt increase and the loss is said to be for capital investments, but there is no clear separation between stadium spending and player transfer spending.

Third, what is the broadcasting revenue? Although total revenue is published, the split between domestic TV revenue and UEFA revenue is not fully disclosed.

Fourth, what is the financial plan for 2026-27? Does the club plan to cut costs if it misses Europe again?

These questions are not criticisms. They are questions any responsible financial analyst must ask. And the fact that Milan chose not to answer them in the summary report relayed by the media is a signal about how they want to control the narrative.

But let me be fair to Milan. No football club publishes its full financial details in a press release. That Milan disclosed what it disclosed — total revenue, sponsorship revenue, net debt, equity, and the impact of the European absence — is already a commendable level of transparency compared with many other clubs.

What matters is that we read these numbers in their context, not in isolation.

And what is the context here? It is a club in transition. It is a club that has gone through three profitable years under a new owner, and is now going through its first loss-making year. It is a club with a strong commercial base, but unstable sporting performance. It is a club investing in a long-term stadium project that could change its financial landscape, but also carries considerable risk.

In that context, the 24 million euro loss is not a disaster. It is a reminder that in modern football, sporting success and financial success cannot be separated. And that a club can have everything right commercially, yet still lose money if its team fails to secure European spots.

This is the biggest lesson I draw from Milan's financial report. And it is also the lesson I want to share with my readers.

In many years in the trade, I have witnessed many clubs fall into financial crisis because they depended too much on a single revenue source. Some clubs depended on broadcast revenue, and when the TV contract was renegotiated at a lower price, they collapsed. Some clubs depended on a single sponsor, and when that sponsor withdrew, they struggled. And some clubs depended on European cup revenue, and when they missed Europe, they lost money.

Milan is in the third group. But what is different about them is that they have begun building a more diversified revenue base. Sponsorship revenue over 100 million euros and record matchday revenue are signs they are heading in the right direction. But they have not yet reached the point where these sources can fully offset the shortfall in European revenue.

That is why I call the 24 million euro loss "the crack of a revenue structure too dependent on a single variable." It is not a fatal crack. It is a crack that needs monitoring, and needs fixing before it spreads.

So what does Milan need to do to fix this crack?

First, they need to regain a European spot as soon as possible. This is the only measure that can immediately restore the 70-80 million euro revenue stream. And this is why I call the European spot Milan's "binary financial KPI." It is not a gradual growth indicator. It is an on-off indicator. Either you have it, or you don't. And if you don't, you pay the price.

Second, they need to continue diversifying their revenue. Sponsorship and matchday revenue are stable and predictable streams, less dependent on on-pitch results than European cup revenue. Milan achieving records in these two areas in a non-European season is a commendable feat, and they need to keep building on that base.

Third, they need to control their cost structure more tightly. The 24 million euro loss occurred in a year when revenue fell only 6%. That means costs did not fall in line with revenue. If Milan wants to avoid losses in non-European years, they need a more flexible cost structure that lets them quickly adapt to revenue changes.

Fourth, they need to ensure the stadium project does not become an out-of-control financial burden. This is a long-term project with big profit potential, but also considerable risk. Effective project management and cost control will be the key factors ensuring the new stadium becomes a profitable asset, rather than an unpayable debt.

These four measures do not guarantee success. But they are necessary steps for Milan to get through this difficult period and return to the healthy financial trajectory they had in the three years before.

There is one thing I always remind myself when analyzing football finances: numbers never tell the whole story. Behind every loss is a story of human decisions — about transfer contracts signed or refused, about strategies chosen or ignored, about opportunities seized or missed.

Milan's 24 million euro loss is not just an accounting figure. It is the consequence of a chain of sporting and business decisions: decisions about the squad, decisions about tactics, decisions about transfers, decisions about investment. And behind those decisions are people — from Gerry Cardinale and the RedBird board, to Paolo Scaroni and Massimo Calvelli, to the players and coaches on the pitch.

I have learned that in my trade, the important thing is not to pass judgment on those decisions, but to provide readers with the information they need to form their own. That is why I devote so much space in this article to presenting the numbers, the events, and the different contexts. That is why I point out the gaps in the information provided. And that is why I emphasize that this loss is not a disaster, but a challenge to be managed.

Russia does not only have vodka, but also decisive passes. And Milan does not only have a 24 million euro loss, but also a strong commercial base, a global brand, and a stadium project that could shape its future for decades.

So what is the real story behind this loss? It is the story of a club trying to find a balance between sporting success and financial sustainability in an increasingly harsh football environment. It is the story of a new owner trying to build a sustainable business model, while facing pressure to deliver on-pitch success immediately. It is the story of a team with great potential but not yet the stability to turn that potential into reality.

And it is also the story of a lesson all European football clubs are facing: in the modern football world, sporting success and financial success cannot be separated. You can have a strong commercial base, a global brand, and an ambitious stadium project. But if your team fails to secure European spots, you will pay the price. Not immediately. But certainly.

This is a lesson many clubs have learned in recent years. And Milan, under the reign of Cardinale and RedBird, is in the process of learning it again.

The 24 million euro loss is a notable event, but it is not the end of the story. It is a reminder that football is a game of cycles. There are cycles of on-pitch success, and cycles of financial challenge. There are seasons when everything goes well, and seasons when you face difficulties.

Milan is in a cycle of challenge. But with a strong commercial base, a global brand, and an ambitious stadium project, they have the tools needed to get through it. What they need now is patience, focus, and a bit of luck on the pitch.

Because in football, in the end, everything comes back to what happens on the pitch. No financial report, however cleverly presented, can replace goals. No commercial strategy, however groundbreaking, can replace victories. And no stadium project, however ambitious, can replace the joy of securing a Champions League spot.

That is the truth every football club must face. And that is the truth Milan is facing today, as they look at the financial report with a negative 24 million euro figure on the bottom line.

Virtual transfer data can also cry, if we listen. And Milan's financial report is crying. But its tears are not the tears of despair. They are the tears of a disappointment that can be overcome, a challenge that can be met, a lesson that can be learned.

The question now is: will Milan learn that lesson fast enough to prevent the next loss? The answer will be decided not at the negotiating table or in the boardroom, but on the pitch, in the matches of the 2026-27 season. Where the European spot is decided. Where the club's financial future is shaped. Where every figure in the financial report begins.

From the keyboard to the trench: the distance is just one click. And from a European spot to a 24 million euro loss, the distance is just as short.