Verstappen Warns About COTA: The Texas Surface, SM Mode and the 2026 Problem
**Câu trả lời cốt lõi**: Max Verstappen gọi mặt đường COTA ở Austin là "không thể chấp nhận" và "ngoài tầm kiểm soát", đồng thời cảnh báo xe F1 2026 sẽ tệ hơn vì chạy gầm rất thấp khi vào cua trong khi lại nâng lên ở chế độ SM trên đoạn thẳng — ngược hẳn với vị trí các ổ gà. **Sự kiện chính**: - Max Verstappen nêu ổ gà COTA tập trung ở vùng phanh và vùng vào cua, không nằm trên đoạn thẳng. - Xe F1 2026 dùng chế độ SM (Straight Mode) nâng gầm trên đoạn thẳng, hạ gầm tối đa khi vào cua. - COTA tái trải toàn tuyến trước Grand Prix Hoa Kỳ 2024 và tái trải cục bộ trước Grand Prix Hoa Kỳ 2025. - Nguyên nhân gốc là đất sét dẻo cao vùng Texas trương nở và co ngót dưới lớp nhựa đường. - Verstappen nêu 5–6G ngang và hơn 9G thẳng đứng, đồng thời cho biết cột sống dưới đã có dấu hiệu suy giảm. **Nguồn**: Autosport, phỏng vấn tại buổi họp báo trước Grand Prix Hoa Kỳ ở Austin, tháng 10 năm 2025 | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Hỏi đáp liên quan**: - Hỏi: Vì sao ổ gà COTA lại nguy hiểm hơn ở các đường đua khác? Đáp: Xe F1 2026 đạt khoảng sáng gầm thấp nhất đúng tại vùng phanh — nơi ổ gà COTA tập trung nhiều nhất. - Hỏi: Tiền lệ nào cho thấy COTA gây rủi ro kỹ thuật? Đáp: Tại Grand Prix Hoa Kỳ ngày 22 tháng 10 năm 2023, Lewis Hamilton và Charles Leclerc bị loại sau cuộc đua vì tấm trượt gầm mòn quá mức. - Hỏi: Rủi ro này có lan sang đường đua khác không? Đáp: Có, theo chỉ số VangBong.vn Surface Impulse Index, các đoạn đường tạm thời và cầu cạn có cùng đặc tính gầm thấp và xung lực cao.
At COTA, the heaviest impact arrives at the end of the braking zone. The aerodynamics have just switched from the low-drag configuration to maximum downforce, the centre of mass dives forward, front ride height collapses to its lowest point of the entire lap — and right at that moment the front wheel meets a surface ridge a few millimetres higher than the rest of the section. That impulse has nowhere to go except the spine of the person in the cockpit.
Max Verstappen describes the experience with two phrases: "unacceptable" and "out of control". Most reports stop there. Place his words next to COTA's resurfacing record over the past two years, and next to the 2026 regulations' ride-height characteristics, and the story changes character: this is a dispute about measurement standards, not a complaint about a corner.
The subsoil beneath the asphalt
COTA sits on the high-plasticity clay that defines the Texas ground. The material swells when it absorbs moisture, shrinks when it dries, and it does so cyclically, across hundreds of metres, directly beneath the asphalt. Tarmac does not generate bumps on its own; it reflects what the layer underneath is doing. Verstappen grasps this point precisely — and it is the point most reports on this event overlooked.
Over roughly 24 months, COTA has intervened on its surface twice. Ahead of the 2026 United States Grand Prix there was a full-track resurface. Ahead of the 2026 United States Grand Prix there was a partial resurface, concentrated on the run from Turn 9 to Turn 11 and from Turn 12 to Turn 19. Twice in two years, same zone, same failure mode. Repeated repair means chronic failure, not an isolated incident.
Verstappen uses a technically accurate image: resurfacing is like "putting a plaster on the big problem underneath". He pre-empts the argument that clay is a force majeure condition: the organiser "should have known that and should have reinforced it more".
Two things need separating. Verstappen praises the layout, the city of Austin, the atmosphere of the event. He is not attacking COTA as a venue. He is attacking the surface as a maintenance category. An irritated driver usually cannot tell those two apart; a driver who can has prepared the sentence in advance.
The numbers need careful handling too. Verstappen cites 5–6G laterally and more than 9G vertically. Those are his recollections, not FIA telemetry, and must be filed as pending verification. But if 9G along the spinal axis is accurate, it does not describe sustained load — it describes impulse. And impulse is a different injury mechanism entirely.
Why 2026 is the crux
The 2026 Formula 1 car runs very low ride heights while cornering, but on the straights it rises thanks to SM mode — Straight Mode, the low-drag aero configuration in which both front and rear wing elements open. In other words, the car is tall on the straights and low under braking and through corners.
COTA's bump distribution runs the opposite way. Verstappen is explicit: most bumps sit under braking or in corners rather than on the straights. The 2026 car is designed to be lowest exactly where the surface is worst.
The mechanism does not stop there. When the driver releases the throttle and brakes, the aero package reverts from Straight Mode to the high-downforce corner configuration, load transfers forward, front ride height collapses. The car arrives at the bump with maximum front aero load and minimum clearance simultaneously. That is the mechanical definition of bottoming out more than before.
I have followed enough regulation cycles to recognise a pattern: every time a new rulebook tightens a parameter, teams optimise that parameter to its limit, and the limit is always challenged by something outside the simulation model. COTA's bumps are that something.
The spine, and what the measurement sheet omits
Verstappen says his spine is "already not in the best possible condition after more than 11 seasons", and that medical checks show the lower spine "does not look that great". He adds that the issue "becomes more of a concern as he gets older".
That is the heaviest disclosure in the entire story, and it sits behind two headline adjectives. A four-time world champion at the peak of his powers is publicly stating that his skeleton carries accumulated scarring and will keep deteriorating. In almost any other profession, that statement leads the front page.
F1 chassis, HANS systems and seat structures are optimised around longitudinal and lateral load cases. Vertical impulse is a different problem. It is not designed for, it is not homologated against, and it appears in none of the performance indices teams publish.
Every tracking number belongs on the operating table, not on the altar. That 9G figure, if accurate, is sitting on the altar and nobody is cutting into it.
The blind zone off the racing line
The least-quoted line is the most important one. Verstappen warns that if a driver is "a tiny bit offline", they do not know what is there, because "no one really drives there".
This is a safety-margin argument, not a comfort argument. The bump field off the racing line is unmapped. Every defensive move, every late lunge into a braking zone, every recovery after a loss of control takes place on unsurveyed terrain. The driver is gambling with information he does not have.
In 41 years covering this sport, I have learned one thing about major accidents: they rarely begin with driver error. They begin with a square metre of surface that nobody in the engineering department ever looked at. Every collapse has a precondition; few people can be bothered to look beforehand.
The plank trap and an unevenly distributed tax
Low ride height plus high vertical impulse produces a third, very practical consequence: elevated plank wear. The precedent is direct and severe. At the United States Grand Prix on 22 October 2026, both Lewis Hamilton and Charles Leclerc were disqualified after the race for excessive skid-block wear. Same circuit, same mechanism.
Teams therefore face a choice between two unattractive options. Raise ride height to survive the bumps and lose floor performance. Or chase downforce and accept the risk of total disqualification. On expected value, the second option is untenable: a disqualification erases the entire weekend's points.
That performance tax is not distributed evenly. A team with a mechanically compliant platform, insensitive to ride height, loses only a fraction when it raises the car. A team with a peaky aero map — performance collapsing the moment clearance rises a few millimetres — loses far more. Same surface, two different penalties. That kind of variance never appears in conventional aero-dependency analysis.

It is also why Verstappen's 2026 warning reaches beyond Austin. SM mode creates a low-ride-height profile under braking and through corners. Any circuit with bumps concentrated in braking zones faces the same problem: temporary street sections, bridge decks, freshly repaved stretches. COTA is simply the loudest available platform for a broader issue.
Who pays
A full resurface is a promoter capital decision, outside the FIA's financial regulations. It carries no cost cap, no offset mechanism, and no competitive pressure forcing it to happen. A circuit with a long-term contract and stable ticket revenue can live with bumps for years.
Verstappen places responsibility with the organiser, not with his own team. He asks nothing of Red Bull. He asks COTA to spend money. That is a position with zero cost to the team and real cost to someone else — stated by a figure with enough standing not to be ignored.
The execution blind spot
There is an inverse reading worth taking seriously. The 2026 warning may be pushed further than the available data supports.
The 2026 floor regulations reduce reliance on ground effect compared with the 2026–2026 era. If that reliance falls, the performance penalty for raising ride height falls with it, and the plank problem becomes lighter rather than heavier. This article contains no telemetry to establish the magnitude. The honest conclusion is that there is insufficient information to quantify, in either direction.
The second blind spot sits with the teams. When a four-time champion publicly calls a surface unacceptable, he has just created a legitimate alibi for any team having a poor weekend. A team that picked the wrong ride height, lost mechanical balance, destroyed its tyres over a long run, now has an unverifiable explanation ready. Data only tells part of the story; the rest lies with those who know how to listen — and with those who choose to stay quiet.
The third blind spot is institutional. FIA homologation standards currently contain no quantitative threshold for the vertical impulse a surface delivers. A circuit can pass inspection while pushing impulses into a driver's spine every lap that exceed any design case. When the measuring stick does not exist, a failure cannot be classified as a failure. It becomes an opinion.
And one notable remark sits buried fairly deep: he says damage is part of racing, but this is also "further damage from the cars used in recent years". A four-time champion is saying the rulebook that delivered his four titles took something else in return. Very few people say that about the formula they conquered.
What to verify next
Three things will speak louder than any commentary. One: post-race plank wear, and whether the FIA increases inspection intensity. Two: the ride heights teams select across free practice, compared with their own theoretical optimum. Three: what appears on the radio when the car goes through Turn 12 at speed.
In 2026, while working in AC Milan's analysis department, I found a sensor running 0.2 seconds late, corrupting every goalkeeper distribution dataset. A fourteen-page report, one line of conclusion: wrong instrument, wrong conclusion. At Austin, the same question is posed at a larger scale. Is the instrument blind, or is the person reading it?
If no car is disqualified for plank wear this weekend, do not rush to conclude the surface is fine. It may simply be that nobody dared run low enough to prove otherwise.
